In Iran's once-thriving bazaars, a long-standing tradition of loyalty has given way to widespread discontent. The merchants who have long supplied the country with essential goods now take to the streets, chanting slogans that are hostile to the regime. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has attempted to distance himself from these protests, portraying them as distinct from a broader wave of unrest sweeping the nation.
However, this narrative is far from convincing. The bazaars, once the bedrock of support for the Islamic Republic, have been steadily eroded over the past two decades. The regime's favouritism towards the military and large religious-revolutionary foundations has led to economic stagnation, chronic inflation, and widespread disillusionment among merchants.
Historically, the bazaar played a pivotal role in Iran's 1979 revolution, with powerful merchant groups forming a tight-knit network of influence within the new state. In the aftermath of the revolution, these merchants were rewarded with control over key institutions and ministries. They secured lucrative import licenses, traded goods to Iranians at inflated prices, and profited from preferential access to the official exchange rate.
However, as the Islamic Republic turned towards economic liberalisation in the 1990s, the bazaar's position began to shift. The regime's attempt to sideline Islamist leftists from power led to a consolidation of influence among conservative forces, who have since dominated Iran's politics.
Despite the bazaar's initial support for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's hardline agenda, his economic policies ultimately accelerated its decline. The transfer of state assets to firms affiliated with the IRGC and large religious-revolutionary foundations further eroded the bazaar's power. These entities now form a powerful new bloc within the state, which has displaced the traditional right.
The protests in Iran's bazaars are not an isolated incident but rather a symptom of deeper economic and political dysfunction. The regime's reliance on sanctions evasion and the dominance of the IRGC have hollowed out even the traditional backbone of the state. Khamenei's remarks suggest anxiety, not confidence, and the bazaar's open defiance highlights the challenge confronting the Islamic Republic.
Sanctions relief remains remote, and rolling back the economic and political power of the IRGC-linked conglomerates offers little incentive for the regime. Confronted with these constraints, repression is a readily available option, even at the cost of further alienating a traditional constituency it once relied on for stability and loyalty.
However, this narrative is far from convincing. The bazaars, once the bedrock of support for the Islamic Republic, have been steadily eroded over the past two decades. The regime's favouritism towards the military and large religious-revolutionary foundations has led to economic stagnation, chronic inflation, and widespread disillusionment among merchants.
Historically, the bazaar played a pivotal role in Iran's 1979 revolution, with powerful merchant groups forming a tight-knit network of influence within the new state. In the aftermath of the revolution, these merchants were rewarded with control over key institutions and ministries. They secured lucrative import licenses, traded goods to Iranians at inflated prices, and profited from preferential access to the official exchange rate.
However, as the Islamic Republic turned towards economic liberalisation in the 1990s, the bazaar's position began to shift. The regime's attempt to sideline Islamist leftists from power led to a consolidation of influence among conservative forces, who have since dominated Iran's politics.
Despite the bazaar's initial support for President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's hardline agenda, his economic policies ultimately accelerated its decline. The transfer of state assets to firms affiliated with the IRGC and large religious-revolutionary foundations further eroded the bazaar's power. These entities now form a powerful new bloc within the state, which has displaced the traditional right.
The protests in Iran's bazaars are not an isolated incident but rather a symptom of deeper economic and political dysfunction. The regime's reliance on sanctions evasion and the dominance of the IRGC have hollowed out even the traditional backbone of the state. Khamenei's remarks suggest anxiety, not confidence, and the bazaar's open defiance highlights the challenge confronting the Islamic Republic.
Sanctions relief remains remote, and rolling back the economic and political power of the IRGC-linked conglomerates offers little incentive for the regime. Confronted with these constraints, repression is a readily available option, even at the cost of further alienating a traditional constituency it once relied on for stability and loyalty.