India's close ties with Bangladesh, the world's eighth-largest economy, are being put to the test as Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina faces a death sentence for crimes against humanity. The 2024 student-led protests that led to her ousting have made her a polarizing figure in Dhaka, where many see her as an autocrat.
Hasina, who has been in power since 2009, was sentenced by a special tribunal in Bangladesh for her crackdown on the protests, which forced her to flee and paved the way for Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. Elections are due early next year, but it remains to be seen whether the new government will continue to align with India's interests.
For India, few friendships have been as strategically valuable - and as politically costly - as its long embrace of Bangladesh. During 15 years in power, Hasina delivered what Delhi prizes most in its periphery: stability, connectivity and a neighbour willing to align its interests with India's rather than China's. However, the situation has become increasingly awkward for Delhi.
India is facing four unappealing options: handing over Hasina, maintaining the status quo, pressuring her to stay silent, or finding a third country to take her in. Extraditing Hasina is unthinkable - India's ruling party and opposition alike view her as a close friend. "India prides itself on not turning on its friends," according to Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert.
The situation has created a diplomatic bind: Dhaka wants Hasina extradited, but Delhi has shown no inclination to comply - making her death sentence effectively unenforceable. The fallout from all this has made Bangladesh's interim government, under Yunus, rebalance its external ties, including cancelling judicial exchanges with India and renegotiating Indian energy deals.
Many believe Bangladesh is hedging hard against India, which is a major trading partner in South Asia. A recent survey by the Dhaka-based Centre for Alternatives found more than 75% of Bangladeshis viewed ties with Beijing positively, compared to just 11% for Delhi - reflecting sentiments after last year's uprising.
India needs to tread carefully as it weighs its relationship with Bangladesh. The next elected government will need to balance Bangladesh's core interests - border security, trade and connectivity - against domestic politics and public anti-India sentiment. "I don't anticipate a serious crisis in ties, but I suspect they'll remain fragile at best," says Dr Avinash Paliwal.
The question is whether India can repair the deeper political rupture and reassure friendly governments that it will stand by them without inviting accusations of shielding leaders with troubling human rights records. The answer lies in navigating this complex relationship and finding a balance between its strategic interests and its commitment to human rights and democracy.
Hasina, who has been in power since 2009, was sentenced by a special tribunal in Bangladesh for her crackdown on the protests, which forced her to flee and paved the way for Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus to lead an interim government. Elections are due early next year, but it remains to be seen whether the new government will continue to align with India's interests.
For India, few friendships have been as strategically valuable - and as politically costly - as its long embrace of Bangladesh. During 15 years in power, Hasina delivered what Delhi prizes most in its periphery: stability, connectivity and a neighbour willing to align its interests with India's rather than China's. However, the situation has become increasingly awkward for Delhi.
India is facing four unappealing options: handing over Hasina, maintaining the status quo, pressuring her to stay silent, or finding a third country to take her in. Extraditing Hasina is unthinkable - India's ruling party and opposition alike view her as a close friend. "India prides itself on not turning on its friends," according to Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert.
The situation has created a diplomatic bind: Dhaka wants Hasina extradited, but Delhi has shown no inclination to comply - making her death sentence effectively unenforceable. The fallout from all this has made Bangladesh's interim government, under Yunus, rebalance its external ties, including cancelling judicial exchanges with India and renegotiating Indian energy deals.
Many believe Bangladesh is hedging hard against India, which is a major trading partner in South Asia. A recent survey by the Dhaka-based Centre for Alternatives found more than 75% of Bangladeshis viewed ties with Beijing positively, compared to just 11% for Delhi - reflecting sentiments after last year's uprising.
India needs to tread carefully as it weighs its relationship with Bangladesh. The next elected government will need to balance Bangladesh's core interests - border security, trade and connectivity - against domestic politics and public anti-India sentiment. "I don't anticipate a serious crisis in ties, but I suspect they'll remain fragile at best," says Dr Avinash Paliwal.
The question is whether India can repair the deeper political rupture and reassure friendly governments that it will stand by them without inviting accusations of shielding leaders with troubling human rights records. The answer lies in navigating this complex relationship and finding a balance between its strategic interests and its commitment to human rights and democracy.